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bility may be imposed without further reference to more flagrant types
of conduct.
Third, the host-driver's duty of care to his guest passenger is
greater than previously believed to be the case. The injured passenger
has a better chance for recovery under the final holding of the Carraway case than under the now discredited doctrine that equated conduct sufficient for guest statute recovery with culpable negligence to
sustain a manslaughter conviction. However, as before, the court may
still determine whether particular allegations make out a case of gross
34
negligence and allow a jury determination only in doubtful cases.
WILLIAM

L.

EAGAN

PERJURED TESTIMONY: FLORIDA'S SUBSTANTIVE
WINDOW
"Leave no jurisdictional doubts, lest Their Honors take a
running dive out the nearest window to avoid a difficult
substantive decision."1
This caveat is indicative of a problem confronting the appellate
advocate before the Florida Supreme Court. The problem is twofold.
Not only can the Court avoid a difficult substantive decision by means
of a procedural window but it may escape through a substantive window to avoid a thorny substantive question. The sign above the
window herein discussed might very well read, "For Perjured Testimony, Use This Exit."
Assume that an innocent man has been convicted of a serious
2
crime. The basis of the jury's verdict of guilty was the perjured
testimony of a witness partaking in a conspiracy against the defendant.
The defendant may or may not have known the testimony to be false,
and the prosecuting officer may or may not have had knowledge of
the fraud being perpetrated on the court. In any event, the defendant
was unable to prove that the testimony was wilfully false; he could
3

4See Dean v. Deas, 116 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 1959); Wilson v. Eagle, 120 So. 2d 207

(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
'Miller, Introduction to Oral Argument of an Appeal, 25 FLA. L.J. 219, 220

(1951).
2The adjective perjured as used in this note refers to a wilfully false statement
concerning a material issue; it does not necessarily indicate that there has been
an adjudication of guilt of the crime of perjury.
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only introduce evidence contradictory to the perjured testimony. The
jury, duped by the apparent credibility of the perjurer, rendered a
verdict of guilty.
Suppose that at some time subsequent to the trial the defendant
could prove the falsity of the evidence upon which his conviction
was based. The layman as well as the lawyer would assume that correction of this miscarriage of justice would be forthcoming. Basically,
the problem boils down to what remedy, if any, Florida affords to an
individual whose conviction of a crime has been affirmed by a Florida
appellate court, and who thereafter petitions the appellate court to
permit the trial court to hear the proof of his allegation that his
conviction was based upon perjured testimony.
A study of the Florida cases and those of most other jurisdictions
dealing with perjured testimony reveals considerable judicial reluctance to provide a remedy. The incongruity of the position taken
by the courts is best illustrated by examination and analysis of the
existing decisions in the area, with a concomitant evaluation of the
legal reasoning involved. Inasmuch as the basic fallacy appears to be
in the erroneous application of previous decisions, the deviation
from a "true course" is cumulative in effect; and therefore an analysis
warrants substantial adherence to the chronological order of the presented cases.
Dictum in Jones v. State3 quite early set the pattern for the Florida
Supreme Court's treatment of convictions based upon perjured testimony. While denying a petition for new trial for insufficiency of
the supporting affidavits, the Court felt compelled to disclose what
Florida's position would be even if the supporting affidavits were
4
sufficient:
"If the other objections could be waived, and the merits of the
matter considered, the court should not have granted a new
trial merely to afford the defendant an opportunity to show
that one of the state's witnesses had made statements inconsistent with his testimony at the trial. Shields v. State 45 Conn.
265 [18771."
Since this dictum formed the foundation for a long line of Florida
cases and eventually became stare decisis, it is advisable to examine
335 Fla. 289, 295, 17 So. 284, 285 (1895).

41bid.
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closely the case cited by the Court. In Shields v. State the alleged
rape victim identified the defendant as the person who had raped her.
Subsequent to the trial, the complainant made an affidavit to the
effect that she was mistaken in her testimony and was not sure that
the defendant was her attacker. The Connecticut court denied the
petition for a new trial. It is important to note that the court did not
base its decision on the truth or falsity of the affidavit. It merely took
note of established precedent in the field of civil litigation and relied
upon two principles garnered therefrom: (1) New evidence must
not be introduced to impeach a witness, and (2) there should be
finality of litigation in the courts. As authority the court cited,
among others, three civil cases.5 This arbitrary usage of principles
derived from a different area of the law constitutes the fallacy in
the decision.
The chief reason for applying res judicata in civil suits is to
establish finality of litigation. But there appears to be manifest injustice in transplanting this doctrine into the criminal law, where
one's life or liberty is at stake, without also securing to a defendant
safeguards against its misuse. Where is the cloak of innocence that
clothes a man until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt? A
court should not permit a conviction to stand simply because in
private disputes finality of litigation is a desirable result.
The next significant step taken by the Florida Supreme Court
in dealing with convictions based upon perjured testimony was in
Nickels v. State.6 Once again the Court, by way of dictum, reflected
upon the remedies available to the allegedly aggrieved petitioner. In
this instance the defendant sought leave to apply to the trial court for
a writ of error coram nobis. 7 Notwithstanding the fact that this writ
was created for use in civil disputes, it was early seized upon for use
in criminal cases. The writ was taken in its entirety from its civil
5

Parsons v. Platt, 37 Conn. 564 (1871) (breach of warranty); Bond v. Cutter, 7

Mass. 205 (1810); Johnson v. Blanchard, 5 R.I. 24 (1857).

686 Fla. 208, 215, 98 So. 497, 499 (1923).
7This is an old common law writ which was created for review in civil cases
when there was no other available remedy. Use of the writ was generally predicated
upon the following requirements: (1) There must have been an error of fact
occurring at the trial that did not appear in the record; (2) neither the petitioner
nor his counsel could have, by due diligence, discovered the error and corrected it
at trial; and (3) the error must have been such that it would hale given the
opposite result if it had been discovered. See generally FRANK, CORAM NOBIS (1953).
For Florida's use of the writ in civil litigation see Vining v. American Bakeries
Co., 121 Fla. 116, 163 So. 396 (1935).
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context, however, carrying with it some features and requirements
wholly unsuited to the criminal law.8 The Court stated that the writ
would not lie for false testimony or for the newly discovered evidence.
As authority for this proposition, the Court cited Jones v. State,9 a
Washington case, 10 and a Kansas case.1" An analysis of these two
foreign cases will, however, shed more light on the reasoning relied
upon by the Florida Court. The Washington Supreme Court cited
no authority for its holding, but it felt that the petition for a writ
of error coram nobis was insufficient. That a witness was willing to
swear that he had given false testimony did not give his second oath
any more credibility than his first. The court, impressed by the
necessity for finality of litigation, found that since it could believe
either of the stories told by the witness, the testimony at trial would
be taken as true. Thus res judicata once again prevented a man from
challenging the truthfulness of the evidence upon which he was convicted. Did this decision actually resolve the doubts raised by the
petitioner's allegation? When grave doubts are raised as to the
validity of a conviction, it seems that life and liberty should be valued
more highly than the mere convenience of finality of court decisions.
The inapplicability of these doctrinal requirements to decisions involving life and liberty is aptly illustrated by Bouvier, as quoted by
2
Black:'
"RES JUDICATA FACIT EX ALBO NIGRUM; EX NIGRO,
ALBUM; EX CURVO, RECTUM; EX RECTO, CURVUM.
A thing adjudged [the solemn judgment of a court] makes
white, black; black, white; the crooked, straight; the straight,
crooked."
The Kansas Supreme Court was likewise inclined toward the argument that there should be finality of litigation to the extent that
the argument was allowed to override the allegation that under fear
induced by threats a witness had testified falsely at the trial. The
Kansas judiciary also reasoned that the credibility of the witness was
at issue in the trial, as was the truth or falsity of his statements, and
therefore the matter had already been adjudged and could not furnish
sSee generally FRANK, CoAM NOBIS (1953).
935 Fla. 289, 17 So. 284 (1895).
'oState v. Superior Ct., 15 Wash. 539, 46 Pac. 399 (1896).
"'State v. Asbell, 62 Kan. 209, 61 Pac. 690 (1900).
12LAiv DIcrIONARY 1471 (4th ed. 1951).
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a basis for issuance of the writ. As authority for this proposition the
court cited the previously discussed Washington case and an 1857
Tennessee decision.13 The Tennessee case, however, was civil, not
criminal. In citing these cases as authority the Florida decision in
Nickels v. State, a criminal case, is grounded on a doctrine mainly
applicable to civil cases.
In 1926 the Florida Supreme Court, again by way of dictum, reasserted in Lamb v. State14 the proposition that coram nobis could
not be invoked when an important witness testified falsely at trial.
Although not germane to the decision, the Court stated that the writ
would not lie for perjured testimony. This decision allowed the
writ to issue upon the mere allegation of newly discovered evidence.
This was the first clear indication that the Court would grant relief
in other situations in which the writ was demanded but would balk
at the allegation of perjury. In support of this dictum, the Court
relied on the previously cited Kansas and Washington cases and People
v. Mooney.' 5 An inquiry into the holding in the Mooney case is
justified at this point, inasmuch as the United States Supreme Court
in Mooney v. Holohan'6 severely criticized the California court.
Mooney petitioned the California Supreme Court for leave to apply
to the trial court for a writ of error coram nobis on the basis of fraud
perpetrated by the prosecuting officer. It was alleged that the prosecutor had wilfully used false testimony in order to obtain a conviction. The California Supreme Court held that the truthfulness of
the testimony had been adjudicated at trial and for this reason could
not be a basis for invoking the writ. Concerning the remedies available to the victims of perjured testimony procured by a prosecutor the
Court stated:1 7
" 'Nor can it be said that the duty of a district attorney differs
in the trial of criminal actions from that of counsel in civil
actions. Each has an equal duty imposed upon him by the
oath he has taken and by the law of the land to present to the
Court and to the jury only competent and legitimate evidence
from which may be determined the truth of the issues involved.
13Bigham v. Brewer, 36 Tenn. 307 (1857).
1491 Fla. 396, 405, 107 So. 535, 538 (1926). This case contains a well-written
synopsis of the usage and requirements of the writ of error coram nobis.
15178 Cal. 525, 174 Pac. 325 (1918).
16294 U.S. 103 (1934).
17178 Cal. at 530, 174 Pac. at 327.
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If that obligation be violated and perjured testimony produced or material evidence suppressed by either ... in so far
as the judgment is concerned, the injured party is without
remedy.'"
It is difficult to conceive that this statement represents the Florida
Court's opinion as to the standard of conduct required of the state's
prosecuting officer in aiding the state to dispense justice. Furthermore, can it be logically argued that this was newly discovered evidence going to an issue already tried before the jury? It is carrying
conjecture too far to conclude that the jury, of its own volition, carefully considered the possibility that they were being duped by a
prerehearsed drama involving subornation and perjury. At the time
of trial the defendant was without proof with which to support his
allegations and could not with due diligence have gathered it. To
deny him a remedy after acquisition of the proof appears to lack
fairness.
Chambersv. State' is a dear example of the Florida Court's awareness of the necessity for providing maximum certainty before breathing finality into a pronouncement of guilt. This case, though not
involving perjured testimony, dealt with the writ of error coram
nobis in a manner apparently much more consistent with the fundamentals of due process than the cases hereinbefore discussed. The
petitioner alleged that the testimony and confession that had been
given at the trial were false and were procured by duress. In granting
the writ, the Court agreed unanimously that if the allegations were
true, the irregularities were sufficiently serious to warrant further
consideration by the trial court. The Court reasoned that it was
not the province of the appellate court to determine the truth or
falsity of the allegations but rather to determine whether the allegations, if true, would make out a prima facie case sufficient to render
a result opposite to the one previously obtained. It further stated
that the ground for issuance of the writ must rest on the fact that
the error complained of could not have been effectively cured or defended against because of fear, duress, or other sufficient cause. A
comparison of Chambers with those cases previously cited in which
an opposite result was reached reveals only one significant distinction.
In Chambers the false witness was the defendant and the victim of
the fraud, whereas in the others the false witness was not the de18111 Fla. 707, 152 So. 437 (1934).
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fendant. Perhaps the Court felt that Chambers' statements, which
were not wilfully false but elicited under duress, should not be used
to convict him. That the giver of the false testimony under fear of
reprisal from the prosecutor was an ordinary witness instead of a
defendant and victim of the fraud does not seem to justify a contrary
result. It is difficult to reconcile Chambers with the Mooney case or
with Pike v. State.19 An attempt to reconcile them must necessarily
involve conjecture, but there is much that leads to the conclusion
that the allegations of perjury in the earlier cases made the difference
by opening up the window.
A common complaint among laymen is that the wheels of justice
turn too slowly. To be sure, this complaint would be echoed by Mr.
Mooney, who spent the seventeen years from 1917 to 1934 in a California prison while attempting to secure a new trial. However, Mr.
Mooney did induce the United States Supreme Court to determine
by way of dictum that procurement of perjured testimony, and a
conviction based upon that testimony, is a deprivation of due process
of law:20
"It [due process] is a requirement that cannot be deemed to
be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived
a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is
but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through
a deliberate deception of the court and jury by the presentation
of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a
State to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation."
In reaching this conclusion, the Court found the necessary "state
action" needed to invoke the fourteenth amendment in the person
of the prosecuting attorney. Although it is recognized that the fourteenth amendment can be invoked by the United States Supreme
Court only when there is "state action," it is well to note that the
Court's language has a deeper implication. If the last quoted sentence were reconstructed, simply leaving in place of the word state
19103 Fla. 594, 139 So. 196 (1931).
20Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1934). The petition for an original
writ of habeas corpus was denied for failure to exhaust state remedies; however, a
substantial part of the opinion was the dictum dealing with the use of perjured
testimony.
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a blank to be filled in with "individual" or "group" or "person,"
would this action be any less "inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice"? Here the injustice is a conviction based upon
perjured testimony; the requirement of state action is merely to invoke the fourteenth amendment. It would appear that such a conviction, no matter how or by whom procured, would be violative of
the due process provisions of Florida's own Declaration of Rights. It
is also interesting to note that the Supreme Court equates a conviction procured by perjury with one resulting from intimidation. This
same equation illustrates the irreconcilability of the "perjury" cases
with Chambersv. State.
Two years passed before the principles of Mooney v. Holohan were
to be considered by the Florida Supreme Court in Skipper v. Schumacker.21 Possibly influenced by the opposites represented by the
Mooney case and established Florida precedent, the decision did
little to settle the question. The petitioner had applied for a writ
of habeas corpus. His petition was based upon the allegation that a
key witness had been induced by several grand jurymen to testify
falsely and to withhold information from the defendant and his attorney. The allegation specifically identified the procuring parties as
state authorities in an obvious effort to show "state action," so as
to bring the petition within the scope of the recently reported Mooney
decision. The legal effect of these acts, it was alleged, denied the defendant due process of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Initially the Court, splitting the proverbial hair, reasoned that
the action of only a few grand jurors was not "state action" as distinguished from the acts of a prosecuting attorney. Thus it concluded that the fourteenth amendment was inapplicable. Is not the
grand jury an organ of the court, with a duty to act as its accusatorial
arm; and therefore is it not just as much an integral part of state
judicial action as the prosecutor, who carries out another function
of the court? The Court reversed itself, however, probably as a result
of the Mooney case, recognizing that there might be a fundamental
unfairness involved. It was submitted that the petitioner need not
rely upon the United States Constitution, since sections 1 and 12
of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution also guarantee due process of law. The Court said: "If the facts alleged are true,
and can be proven, which of course remains to be seen, there ought
to be some remedy." 22 Habeas corpus, the Court felt, was not the
21124 Fla. 384, 169 So. 58 (1936).
221d. at 401, 169 So. at 65.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol13/iss3/6

8

Graff: Perjured Testimony: Florida's Substantive Window
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

proper remedy, since the lower court had jurisdiction and its decision
could not be attacked as a void judgment by that writ. It appeared
to the Court that the only applicable writ was coram nobis, and as
authority it cited Lamb v. State. It is difficult to understand the
Court's use of the Lamb case for authority, since that case stood for
the proposition that coram nobis would not lie for perjured testimony
or for newly discovered evidence going to the merits. This seeming
anomaly is resolved by distinguishing factors that are, at best, extended rationalizations of the Lamb decision when viewed in the
shadow of the Mooney case. The petition in Skipper was ultimately
denied, however, for failure to make full and specific disclosure sufficient to show the required prima facie case for issuance of the writ.
Armed with the decision in Skipper v. Schumacker, Skipper then
reapplied to the Court 23 by presenting the affidavits called for in the
prior decision. The bulwark of these proofs was an affidavit of the
witness recanting his former testimony and admitting perjury. The
Court was not willing, however, to follow the path it had outlined in
the former Skipper decision. Instead, the justices returned to res
judicata and denied the petition by a mere citation and a quotation
from the Lamb dictum. In ordering this denial, the Court failed to
adhere to its well-reasoned arguments in Chambers v. State. In that
case it had decided that it was not the province of the appellate court
to determine the truth or falsity of the allegation but rather to satisfy
itself that the allegations made out a prima facie case. Yet in this
instance the Court felt that since either the testimony at trial was
untrue or the affidavits were untrue, the writ should not issue for
failure to make out a prima facie case. Apparently, nothing less than
actual proof of the allegations would satisfy this standard of a prima
facie case. Since the presentation of testimony and other evidence is
not permitted before the appellate tribunal, the success of a petition
becomes an impossibility. Such circular reasoning requires the proofs
before a writ will issue to allow presentation of the proofs. In stating
that "there must be an end to litigations and trials, ' ' 24 the Court
once again borrowed doctrinal arguments from the civil field, citing
as authority the decision in a contract case. 25 Although of no consolation to Mr. Skipper, the lamp of justice was not yet out; and its
flame began to flicker again in the person of Mr. Justice Brown, "the
23Skipper v. State, 127 Fla. 553, 173 So. 692 (1937).
241d. at 554, 173 So. at 693.
25Jennings v. Pope, 101 Fla. 1476, 136 So. 471 (1931).
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lone dissenter." He argued that the Court in Skipper v. Schumacker
had dictated the path to be followed. He also thought that the petition made out a prima facie case and that the majority of the Court
had lost sight of the fact that it is the trial court's role to hear the
proofs and that the Supreme Court merely inquires as to the sufficiency
of the allegations.
Another decision of the Florida Court 26 illustrates the excellent
approach it takes toward the correction of error when perjured testimony is not involved. In this instance the prosecuting witness had
testified at trial that the value of a cow was $50.00. The petitioner
submitted newly discovered evidence consisting of an affidavit of that
same witness made previous to the trial for the purpose of securing
the issuance of a search warrant, which affidavit declared that the
value of the cow was only $25,00. In allowing the petition for a
new trial the Court said:27
"This and other courts have approved the rule granting a
new trial on newly discovered evidence when circumstances warrant and the ends of justice require....
"The evidence on which the verdict was rendered being
unsatisfactory as to these points, we think the ends of justice
require a new trial."
There seems to be little justification for a contrary result in the
perjury cases. Basically, the problem still involves an inconsistent
statement by a witness for the prosecution which puts the truth of
the testimony given at trial in doubt. Yet, when not facing "the
window" or burdened by previous dictum, the Court easily reaches
the conclusion that justice demands a new trial. In support of the decision reached in this case the Court cited Adams v. State, a Florida
holding, the language of which exemplifies the course that the courts
28
should follow:
"It may be that the proposed newly discovered evidence
is liable to some criticism as being cumulative to that of the
defendant or as being in rebuttal of that of the state. See ...
Jones v. State .... But while admitting that the general rules
26Hicks v. State, 127 Fla. 669, 173 So. 815 (1937).
'
271d. at 670, 173 So. at 815.
2855 Fla. 1, 6, 46 So. 152, 154 (1908).
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regulating the granting of new trials on the ground of newly
discovered evidence are wise and should generally be adhered
to, they are not inflexible, and must sometimes bend in order
to meet the ends of justice."
It is difficult to understand why the Court, in the perjury cases,
followed Jones v. State and other cases the basic reasoning of which
was borrowed from the field of civil litigation. The reasoning of
Adams v. State was equally available, far more just, and applicable
to the criminal law.
After the detailed consideration given the two Skipper cases, the
majority of the Florida Court no longer felt constrained to look to
the merits of a case asking for relief from a conviction based upon
perjured testimony. The next three similar cases29 to appear before
the Court were quickly disposed of; the proposition that the writ
would not lie for perjured testimony was stated, and previously discussed cases were cited as authority. 30
In Hysler v. State31 the Court devotes one paragraph to the fact
that there was other ample evidence to support the conviction before
launching into its usual summary dismissal by citing Lamb v. State.
But nowhere in the opinion is there any reference to what this evidence was. It would appear that this passing reference to the ample
evidence was merely to appease Justice Brown, who once again dissented, this time without opinion. Hysler was granted certiorari and
appeared before the United States Supreme Court in 1942. As in
the Court below, the petitioner contended that the prosecutor had
intimidated a witness into testifying falsely against him at the trial."
The Florida Court's decision was affirmed by a majority of the Supreme Court. The majority agreed with the petitioner that if the
facts as alleged were true it would amount to deprivation of liberty
without due process of law on the basis of Mooney v. Holohan. The
Court said, however, that mere recantation was not enough to invoke
the due process clause and that the Florida Court was acting within
the bounds of due process under the fourteenth amendment in requiring the state to be an active party to the fraud and within its
29Hysler v. State, 146 Fla. 593, 1 So. 2d 628 (1941); Yon v. State, 138 Fla. 770,

190 So. 252 (1939); Jones v. State, 130 Fla. 645, 178 So. 404 (1938).
3oSkipper v. State, 127 Fla. 553, 173 So. 692 (1937); Pope v. Jennings, 101 Fla.
1476, 136 So. 471 (1931); Lamb v. State, 91 Fla. 396, 107 So. 535 (1926).
31146 Fla. 593, 1 So. 2d 628 (1941).
32Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411 (1942).
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discretionary powers when it deemed the petition insufficient to show
state participation.
Mr. Justice Black, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice
Murphy concurred, dissented.3 3 They chose to look at the merits of
the case rather than merely to ratify the Florida Court's decision, as
was done by the majority. It was the contention of the dissenters that
this was not the proper place to determine whether the Mooney v.
Holohan rule was applicable only when the prosecutor had guilty
knowledge of the perjury, since such knowledge had actually been
alleged here. They noted that the Supreme Court in past cases involving coerced confessions 4 had not deemed knowledge of coercion
by either court or prosecutor relevant, and they could see no reason
for requiring it in this case. It was clear to the dissenters that the
holding incommunicado and torturing of witnesses into supplying
the controlling testimony at trial are sufficient to establish a violation
of constitutional rights. Furthermore, it was recognized by these
justices that the Florida Supreme Court had not passed upon the
credibility of Hysler's allegations but that it had merely decided that
these allegations, however fully proved, would not constitute a violation of due process. Justice Black went on to admonish his colleagues
for not considering the merits and accepting Florida's decision as
validly showing that the petitioner had not met its requirements. In
addition, he stated that it was apparent that if Florida had really
looked to the merits and decided on the basis of its standard the writ
would have issued. In support of this position Justice Black cited a
Florida decision 3 5 that held, as did Skipper v. Schumacker and Chambers v. State, that if the facts alleged - not the proofs - were sufficient
to support a prima facie case, the writ would issue.
Later that same year, in Pyle v. Kansas,3 6 the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of habeas corpus on the allegation that
the prosecution had procured and used perjured testimony at the
trial, which resulted in a conviction. No proofs were required at that
stage nor was the "state standard" allowed to dictate the requirements
of due process to the Supreme Court. It is hard to reconcile such a
decision with the Hysler case.
In subsequent decisions the Florida Court continued arbitrary
331d.

at 428.

34E.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278 (1936).
S5Washington v. State, 92 Fla. 740, 110 So. 259 (1926).
36317 U.S. 213 (1942).
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denials of petitions.3 7 Finally, in 1957, the influence of the United
States Supreme Court decisions began to make inroads on the established line of Florida precedent.38 In the face of a petition alleging
that a conviction was based upon perjured testimony procured by
the prosecution the Florida Court issued the writ. It would appear
from the language of the opinion that, seeing no way to distinguish
this case from Mooney v. Holohan or Pyle v. Kansas, the Florida
Court reluctantly bowed.
By virtue of a recent United States Supreme Court decision 39 the
sorely needed bolt and lock on Florida's perjured testimony window
may soon be installed. In granting relief to the petitioner, the Court
began by reiterating the propositions of Mooney v. Holohan and
Pyle v. Kansas. Here, however, the Court went one step further in
saying, "The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears."'0
This admonition was with reference to a prosecuting attorney who
failed to correct fraud within his knowledge. A reasonable interpretation would lead to the conclusion that a similar obligation would
be imposed upon the reviewing court to order a rehearing to determine whether fraud existed and to remedy it if it should be proved.
As a consequence of this decision, it is quite probable that should the
Florida Supreme Court fail to take steps for the investigation and correction of fraud it would be a denial of due process, the action or inaction of the prosecuting officer notwithstanding. The Supreme Court
made a further inroad into the effects of perjured testimony and the
need for correction by asserting:41
"The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit in any concept of ordered liberty, does not cease
to apply merely because the false testimony goes only to the
credibility of the witness. The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determi37Bell v. State, 90 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1956) (accomplice recanted testimony given
at trial); Snell v. State, 158 Fla. 431, 28 So. 2d 863 (1947) (subornation of perjury
and introduction of fake evidence by state attorney); James v. State, 152 Fla. 529,
12 So. 2d 311 (1943) (3 witnesses committed perjury in effort to "sink" defendant).
3
sState ex rel. Simpson v. Mayo, 95 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1957).
39Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
401d. at 269.

4'lbid.
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native of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely
that a defendant's life or liberty may depend."
Thus another line of reasoning used by the Florida Supreme Court
2

has been challenged.4

CONCLUSION

The need for reform in Florida's treatment of convictions based
upon perjured testimony is evident from a perusal of the Florida
Court's opinions during the past sixty-five years. The cases present
confusion, beginning with the usurpation of principles native to civil
litigation and their usage as dictum in the criminal field and culminating in unwavering adherence to these doctrines as stare decisis.
The courts have developed a reflex action to the words perjured
testimony and seem to dispose of this problem automatically without
consideration of the merits. On occasion, the Florida Court has suggested that the remedy sought by the aggrieved party was a matter for
the pardon board rather than the Court. Clearly such an assertion
fails to recognize that the adjudication of criminal guilt is rightfully
and constitutionally a matter for complete judicial determination.
The assertion also fails to recognize that fraud perpetrated upon the
trial court renders the trial a nullity, and therefore the judicial hearings involved are void ab initio and cannot satisfy the requirements
of due process. Although the pardon board does have an "extrajudicial" function, referral of a case of this nature to that body cannot cure the inherent defects in the judicial proceedings. It is evident that cases remanded by the United States Supreme Court for
correction by the state for denial of due process are sent back to
the courts and not referred to an administrative body.
It must be realized, however, that the Florida courts are faced
with a difficult problem. The history of this area of the law exhibits
the diligent effort of the Florida judiciary to solve the problem. When
one realizes that a great number of the petitioners who assert that
perjured testimony was the basis of their conviction are in fact
concocting a fraudulent story themselves in a last ditch effort to foil
just administration of the law, he cannot look too critically upon
42The writ will not lie to impeach the credibility of a witness. See Snell v.
State, 158 Fla. 431, 28 So. 2d 863 (1947).
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